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What is the best way to avoid that financial institu-
tions become ‘too big to fail’? One approach par-
ticularly popular among policymakers is the build-
ing of special bank insolvency policies that aim to 
resolve any financial institutions without systemic 
consequences. Danish authorities are among the 
first to have actually used the new resolution ap-
proach, and the Danish case thus offers a num-
ber of lessons about the problems and potentials 
of special bank resolution regimes.
1. Introduction
The problem of too big to fail (TBTF), i.e. that some 
financial institutions have grown so big and complex that 
authorities will not let them fail because of the systemic 
consequences it would entail, has consistently ranked 
among the most salient and controversial issues in post 
crisis financial regulatory debates. The reasons are ob-
vious: TBTF institutions exacerbate systemic risk by 
creating massive contingent liabilities for governments; 
TBTF institutions distort competition, notably through 
the lower funding costs that an implicit state guarantee 
secures; and TBTF institutions undermine public trust in 
the fairness of the financial- and political system (Gold-
stein and Verón 2011). The TBTF-problem has on both an 
international and national level been addressed through 
three avenues of reform: Increased capital- and liquid-
ity requirements (implemented internationally through 
the Basel III accord, complimented by specific national 
requirements), structural reform (size caps, break-up of 
large financial institutions, clear shutters between invest-
ment banking and deposits, etc.) and the building of spe-
cial resolution regimes (SRRs). SRRs are increasingly be-
ing implemented, especially in the financial systems that 
were hit hardest by the crisis (BCBS 2011, FSB 2013). 
The hope and ambition behind implementing SRRs is 
to combat the TBTF problem by requiring that finan-
cial institutions plan for crisis by writing so-called ‘living 
wills’, offering authorities early intervention powers and 
increased discretion in resolving failed institutions, and 
avoiding taxpayers foot the bill by requiring that financial 
institutions hold debt subject to bail-in (e.g. by convert-
ing debt into equity at a predetermined trigger point) and 
build up resolution funds ex ante or ex post.
This paper is organised in two parts. Drawing on 
the international regulatory debate as well as arguments 
from economics, the next section presents the basic argu-
ments for the central role of SRRs in post-crisis financial 
regulation. As will become clear, the benefits of SRRs 
are generally presented in functional terms as a means to 
avoid ‘moral hazard’ in the financial industry by offering 
a credible commitment to wind down financial institu-
tions of any size. As an alternative to the standard ap-
proach, the section argues that SRRs should not only be 
seen as an efficiency enhancing technology but also as a 
political tool used in distributional battles over who wins 
and who loses in banking crises. Section three presents 
a case study of one of the few SRRs that have actually 
been put to use, namely the Danish SRR implemented 
in 2010 and used for the first time in 2011. The Dan-
ish case offers four lessons: First, the implementation of 
the Danish SRR has not led to a less active role for the 
state in banking crises. Rather it signifies an institution-
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alization of the very central role of the state in banking 
crises. Second, following the significant consequences 
of forcing creditors to accept write-downs on unsecured 
and uninsured debt in the closing of Amagerbanken and 
Fjordbank Mors, the Danish SRR has de facto been put 
to rest and replaced by a dowry scheme that helps bail 
out creditors. This demonstrates the difficulties of creat-
ing a market conform special resolution regime that can 
credibly commit authorities to shut down ailing banks 
and ensures that creditors and shareholders bare the costs 
related to crises. Third, the Danish case is ripe with exam-
ples of how the SRR is used to give special treatment to 
financial institutions at politically opportune moments. . 
Fourth, although SRRs can help to provide more power-
ful resolution technologies, they do not solve the politi-
cal problem of the strong incentive to let large financial 
institutions conduct risky businesses in the run-up to a 
crisis, or make it easier for politicians to accept the serious 
real economic consequences of letting financial institu-
tions of any size fail. Thus, TBTF financial institutions 
still enjoy a more or less implicit advantageous position 
vis-á-vis their smaller competitors and it seems doubtful 
that SRRs will do much to change this.
2. What is a Special Resolution Regime?
The basic idea behind special resolution regimes for fi-
nancial institutions is to avoid what is considered two 
suboptimal solutions to bank crises, namely disorderly 
bankruptcy or a bail-out of creditors. During the recent 
crisis, the first kind of solution was used in the case of 
the investment bank Lehman Brothers, while a couple of 
days later the second option was used when the insurance 
company AIG was bailed out using public funds. Both 
solutions were problematic in their own right. Bail-outs 
throw public money after failing financial institutions 
and create an increased incentive for financial institu-
tions to grow bigger and bet on being saved by taxpayers 
in a future crisis. Bail-outs also break with the principle 
that taxpayer funding is the last resort, and instead the 
subordinated creditors that have been paid for taking on 
risk are ranked ahead of taxpayers when it comes to loss 
absorption. Bankruptcy, on the other hand, wipes out 
shareholders and forces hair-cuts on creditors. However, 
given that bankruptcy procedures work relatively slowly 
and do not take financial stability into consideration, 
there is significant risk of creating uncertainty and con-
tagious disruptions in financial markets (see Cihak and 
Nier 2009; Dewatripont and Freixas 2012). 
Viewed from a political perspective, SRRs may be 
thought of as an institutional innovation in distribu-
tional battles between the state, taxpayers and the dif-
ferent financial industry actors. As argued by Mahoney 
and Thelen (2010), institutions inevitably raise resource 
considerations and invariably have distributional conse-
quences, and since any „set of rules or expectations – for-
mal or informal – that patterns action will have unequal 
implications for resource allocation“ (p. 8) it is helpful 
to see the rise of SRRs also as a power struggle. Specifi-
cally, to understand the significance of the new resolution 
policies, we should see them as the state’s manipulation 
of property rights (Campbell and Lindberg 1990). In 
such a perspective, property rights confer power and are 
rules that constrain, enable and locate decision-making 
power over assets (Carruthers and Ariovich 2004), and 
so bankruptcy law (whether in its standard form or as 
SRRs) exemplifies latent, property-rights-based regula-
tion that constitutes a central part of a state’s capacity to 
govern and transform a society’s economic organization. 
Thus, property rights not only determine the relation an 
actor has to his or her property, but also in a broader 
perspective define the institutional basis for power rela-
tions in production, exchange and accumulation (Camp-
bell and Lindberg 1990). In other words, when banks 
are governed under a special resolution regime that gives 
the state greater intervention power and discretion at the 
expense of creditors, shareholders and debtors, this at ba-
sis constitutes a potentially significant change in power 
relations.
To understand the significance of the new resolution 
policies, it is helpful to compare them to standard bank-
ruptcy law. The fundamental difference between normal 
corporate bankruptcy procedures and the way special 
bank resolution regimes function, lies in the coordination 
problem that they are trying to solve (Marinc and Vlahu 
2012, ch. 2). The objective of corporate bankruptcy law is 
to identify the optimal point of bankruptcy for creditors 
and create incentives for creditors not to collect their debt 
prematurely, i.e. cause a run on the corporation by its 
creditors at a point where the corporation is worth more 
as a going concern. From an economic point of view, 
corporate bankruptcy thus aims to promote efficiency in 
the relationship between debtor and creditor both ex-ante 
(when the debtor is solvent) and ex-post (when the debtor 
is already insolvent) (Marinc and Vlahu 2012, 5). As a 
contrast, the primary objective of special bank resolution 
policies is to protect financial stability, which often comes 
at the expense of creditors, shareholders and depositors 
(with deposits below a certain maximum amount covered 
by deposit insurance). 
Bankruptcy in case of bank failures is more compli-
cated than normal corporate bankruptcy (see Marinc and 
Vlahu 2012, ch. 3; Attinger 2011). A primary function 
of banks is to provide liquidity to their creditors (in the 
form of liquid demand deposits) and to their borrowers 
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(in the form of loan commitments), and a rapid disman-
tling of the bank’s liability side or a freezing of bank 
debt cannot be imposed without hindering the liquidity 
provision function of a bank. This means that in contrast 
to corporate bankruptcy that aims to provide a breathing 
space for an insolvent company, special bank bankruptcy 
policies aim at quickly resolving the institution to lower 
the costs of illiquidity. 
The ultimate goal of safeguarding financial stability 
can be achieved in three ways: through prevention, early 
intervention and a number of resolution powers. First, 
SRRs are supposed to deter financial institutions from 
taking on too much risk and behaving irresponsibly in the 
first place. They do so by posing a credible commitment 
to wind down financial institutions of any size. Moreover, 
requiring systemically important financial institutions to 
draw up resolution and recovery plans subject to approval 
by authorities, reflects the basic intention to reduce the 
impact of a possible systemic failure. Such a ‘living will’ 
would typically be a document that describes the dif-
ferent lines of business of the institution, its assets and 
liabilities, operational interdependencies like information 
technology, and more generally how different kinds of 
crises could be handled in a way that either recovers or 
resolves the institution (Herring 2011; Avgouleas et al. 
2013; FSB 2011)
Second, to avoid systemic consequences of a crisis in a 
financial institution, SRRs enable authorities to intervene 
at an earlier point than in the case of corporate bank-
ruptcy and often without the consent of shareholders or 
creditors. They do so by granting authorities enhanced 
early intervention powers. This is maybe the trickiest part 
of SRRs, because it directly impacts on the property 
rights of the owners of financial institutions and their 
creditors. To avoid systemic consequences of the failure 
of a financial institution, authorities have an interest in 
intervening at a pre-insolvency stage, i.e. to avoid actual 
liquidation of the financial institution and instead re-
structure and reorganize it as a going concern while it still 
has positive net worth. This procedure is in important 
ways different from standard bankruptcy procedures, 
since the resolution authority can embark on sales and 
other actions without waiting for a reorganization plan to 
be developed and approved by a bankruptcy judge (DeY-
oung et al. 2013). As argued by Attinger (2011, 9), „the 
bank as a debtor remains in the market and, therefore, 
it is more difficult to justify why (i) creditors should be 
deprived of (part of) their claims; and (ii) shareholders 
should accept an interference in their rights.“ 
Third, SRRs grant authorities a number of resolution 
powers. Though obviously there are variations in which 
powers each regime has, what is common across all of 
these tools is the absence of a subsidy to existing share-
holders, and the imposition of losses on creditors, relative 
to a situation where the firm is bailed out (Cihak and Nier 
2009). One of the most central tools is the technique 
of bailing in creditors. In short, this is a restructuring 
mechanism to recapitalise a firm upon the occurrence of 
a trigger event through the write-down or conversion of 
uninsured or unsecured debt instruments into equity (a 
debt-to-equity-swap) (FSB 2013, 3). The writing down 
of claims has the envisaged benefit of re-establishing the 
firm as a going concern by boosting the bank’s equity 
capital, while shielding taxpayers from losses. A certain 
amount of ‘bail-inable’ debt is supposed to be part of the 
Basel III regulation, but exactly how the process would 
work and how much of such debt would be required re-
mains uncertain at this point.
Another central resolution tool is the ‘bridge bank’-
tool. Bridge banks are temporary institutions created by 
the resolution authority to take over the operation of the 
failing institution and preserve its going concern value, 
while the resolution authority seeks a permanent resolu-
tion of the failure. In the words of Cihak and Nier (2009, 
16), „The bridge bank tool allows the resolution authority 
to ‘bridge’ the gap between an institution’s failure and the 
time when a suitable purchaser has been found“. Other 
popular tools are a sale of business tool that enables au-
thorities to sell off a failing financial institution without 
shareholder consent; a good bank/bad bank split, where 
authorities remove the most healthy assets of a failing 
institution and sell it off, while toxic assets are placed in 
a special purpose entity and then more slowly liquidated; 
and the temporary public control or nationalization of a 
failing institution.
The increased power of the state that follows from 
the setting up of SRRs is perhaps most clearly evident 
in the creation of the early intervention tools and special 
resolution powers that may enable the state to overrule 
shareholder and creditor rights. Thus, early intervention 
powers limit the rights of both creditors and shareholders, 
because they lose their property even though the bank is 
resolved as a going concern, i.e. the financial institution 
or parts of it continue to exist. One example of bypassing 
fundamental rules of bankruptcy – specifically the rules 
that govern the distribution of assets in liquidation (see 
Carruthers et al. 2001, 103) – is found in the resolution 
tool of partial transfer of deposits and assets to a ‘good 
bank’. The transfer of deposits and assets to a ‘good bank’ 
without basis in rules on creditor ranking opens up the 
possibility that some creditors (e.g. junior debt holders) 
are ‘left’ in the bad bank while others (e.g. depositors) 
have their claim transferred to a good bank. (Cihak and 
Nier 2009, 16). Though there might be good reasons 
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from the perspective of financial stability in breaking 
such rules, it nonetheless constitutes not just a technical 
fix but also a tool of power for the state to use (or not).
Second, through the institutionalization of certain 
legal and economic mechanisms that may be used for 
selectively bailing out creditors and depositors of fail-
ing financial institutions, authorities are given enhanced 
discretion in dealing with claims on a failing institu-
tion. With the new policies in place it will be easier to 
cherry-pick creditors that are to be made whole for ex-
ample in a bridge bank-construction, because authorities 
often are given greater administrative discretion at the 
expense of judicial review. Thus, special bank resolution 
regimes generally give authorities more power over finan-
cial institutions in distress, but do not rule out bailing 
out failing financial institutions. If anything, it enables 
a smoother bailout of financial institutions deemed too 
big to fail. Rather than signal the end of TBTF, the crea-
tion of SRRs, then, may instead signal a more explicit 
realization on the part of the authorities that a system of 
bailing out large financial institutions requires a stronger 
institutional foundation than reflected in ad hoc deci-
sions during a crisis. 
3. Lessons from the Danish SRR
Danish crisis management consisted of a number of 
policies put in place with the intention of stabilizing the 
Danish financial sector. Popularly the policies are called 
Bankpackage I-V. The first two bank packages sought 
to help Danish banks re-access international funding 
– first through a state guarantee of all deposits, exclud-
ing covered bonds (Bankpackage I), then through capi-
tal injections (Bankpackage II). Bankpackage III is the 
Danish special resolution regime, while bankpackage IV 
is a dowry scheme that subsidizes takeovers of weak fi-
nancial institutions. Finally, Bankpackage V was created 
more specifically to support a relatively large bank – FIH 
Erhvervsbank – in liquidating a number of its assets in 
an orderly way. This article focuses on bankpackage III-
V, because these are most relevant for understanding the 
Danish SRR1.
3.1 The Danish SRR
In 2010, about a half a year before the state guarantee ex-
pired, work started on creating an SSR in Denmark. Parts 
of the institutional setup for the new SRR had already 
been created through Bankpackage I, namely the wind-
ing up company ‘Finansiel Stabilitet’ (Financial Stabil-
ity), which had as a primary task of securing the payment 
of creditor claims on wound-up institutions and handling 
the controlled dismantling of financial institutions that 
no longer met solvency requirements. The authorities had 
two primary priorities in their work on the new regime: 
First, that it should ensure that normal costumers were 
reasonably covered by a deposit guarantee, and that they 
could access their account and use, for instance, credit 
cards the Monday after the resolution procedure had be-
gun. Second, that creditors could be bailed in and pay 
for resolution relieving the taxpayers of the bill for re-
solving ailing banks. Relating to the latter challenge, the 
resolution regime was designed – as the only scheme in 
Europe at that time – to ensure that in a resolution sen-
ior bondholders suffer losses before the resolution fund. 
The scheme was constructed so that if a bank chooses 
to be unwound under the scheme, a subsidiary company 
is established under a state-owned resolution company, 
called Financial Stability, that takes ownership of assets 
and some liabilities, subsequently wiping out sharehold-
ers and giving senior bondholders a hair-cut on their in-
vestment.
The new regulation, implemented in October 2010, 
was first tested when Amagerbanken, at the time Den-
mark’s fifth largest bank, became insolvent in February 
2011. The bank was nicknamed ‘Armageddonbank’ in 
the international financial press because creditors for the 
first time in modern European history suffered hair-cuts 
on their investment. Thus, in accordance with the Dan-
ish SRR, Amagerbanken was selectively bailed out with a 
transfer of assets and a partial transfer of liabilities. Hold-
ers of the bank’s senior unsecured debt thus swallowed a 
41 per cent writedown on their investment (Bloomberg 
2011)2. The international money markets were quick to 
respond. With the possibility of encountering a signifi-
cant hair-cut, investors were suddenly reluctant to lend 
most Danish banks money (Financial Times 2011a). In 
May 2011 the credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded 
six Danish lenders, including the country’s biggest bank, 
Danske Bank, citing explicitly the lack of „systemic sup-
port“ for the banks. These developments made the Dan-
ish authorities wary. Supposedly, as reported by Finan-
cial Times (2011b), making things tougher for surviving 
banks ‘was not the idea’ when the Danish authorities 
allowed a state guarantee of bank liabilities to lapse two 
years after it was introduced. Thus, in summer 2011 a 
first step was made to avoid using the resolution regime, 
by creating a supplementary ‘dowry-scheme’ that made 
it possible to supply a dowry to cover the exposures of a 
distressed banks’ creditors and depositors for a healthy 
bank interested in taking over the bank. However, in 
June 2011 it turned out that the dowry-scheme was not 
effective in getting a buyer for the small bank Fjordbank 
Mors, which subsequently entered the normal winding-
up process of Bankpackage III, once again grabbing the 
attention of the international capital markets3. 
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Following the realisation that the Danish bail-in 
scheme had been too ambitious at that point of the crisis 
– exposing Danish banks to unwanted pressure from the 
capital markets – in August 2011 a new policy envis-
aged as an alternative to the bail-in scheme was passed 
in agreement between opposition and government, 
popularly called Bankpackage IV. The aim of the new 
scheme was to subsidize takeovers in an effort to ensure 
that troubled banks were not forced to resort to the new 
resolution framework. The bill contained two parts. First, 
the existing dowry-scheme was expanded. Now a healthy 
bank could take over either the whole of the distressed 
bank – where the state offers a dowry of the size of the 
cost that the state would have incurred had the distressed 
bank been unwound using the SRR – or only take over 
the good parts and leave the toxic assets to the state. In 
the latter case, the dowry paid the expenses that the state 
incurred in winding down the bad loans. The transaction 
is subsidized by the Danish Guarantee Fund, which is 
financed collectively by the Danish banking sector. Sec-
ond, a state guarantee can be granted in two instances: 
either where a fusion between two banks leads to the ma-
turing of loans taken out by the distressed bank, that the 
state then guarantees for the remaining period; or when 
two banks merge and one of the banks already has an 
individual guarantee as part of previous crisis measures, 
in which case the banks can obtain a new state guarantee 
with a maturity up to three years. 
The small Max Bank became Denmark’s first insol-
vent lender to test the ability of the new dowry-scheme 
to sidestep the bail-in laws of Bankpackage III. As such, 
the authorities were successful as Sparekassen Sjælland 
ended up taking over the healthy parts of Max Bank 
while the state assumed the bank’s bad loans. Senior 
creditors were thus spared, while shareholders lost their 
investments. Bankpackage IV was once again put to use 
in January 2012, when the two banks Aarhus Lokalbank 
and VestjyskBANK merged. What made their use of the 
dowry scheme interesting was that the two banks were 
both deemed unhealthy, and yet – in contrast to the spirit 
of Bankpackage IV and only after a quick amendment of 
the law made it possible – the authorities welcomed the 
merger and agreed to renew the individual state guaran-
tees of the two banks. 
In March 2012, the fifth and so far final Bankpack-
age was issued in agreement between government and 
opposition. Though the term ‘bankpackages’ alludes to a 
certain degree of generality in the policy, it was actually 
specifically aimed at strengthening one bank, FIH Erh-
vervsbank, the fifth largest bank in Denmark. Following 
Bankpackage V, building sector loans for around 17 bil-
lion DKr were taken over by the state liquidation com-
pany Financial Stability, with FIH Erhvervsbank making 
an unlimited guarantee on the losses that the state incurs 
and the state taking up to 25 per cent of a possible future 
upside. The background for the initiative was that, as 
part of Bankpackage II, FIH Erhvervsbank had received 
individual state guarantees for 42 billion DKr that need 
refinancing in 2012–13. With the low credit rating of 
FIH Erhvervsbank and the generally difficult circum-
stances surrounding financing in international markets, 
the bank had started an aggressive practice of terminat-
ing loans that especially hit the already heavily pressured 
building sector as well as other creditors (notably small 
banks). Now that the bank could shift some of its most 
problematic loans to Financial Stability, it did not have 
to refinance these loans and could instead focus on its 
core business of lending to small and midsize companies. 
Though officially a comparable possibility was open to 
others ‘in a similar situation’, the chairman of the board 
of Financial Stability noted that he knew of no other 
similar cases in Denmark and openly admitted that the 
in principal opening for other banks was only for politi-
cal reasons. 
3.2 Danish lessons
The Danish case offers a number of lessons about the 
role of SRRs in post-crisis financial regulation. First, the 
regulation and organisation of the Danish SRR seems to 
signify an institutionalization of a more direct and pow-
erful state role in governing the Danish financial sector. 
Before the implementation of the Danish SRR, the state 
played an active albeit more informal role. It did so by 
fostering private solutions for banks in trouble by putting 
pressure on other healthier banks to take an active role, 
for example by offering considerable tax deductions to 
incentivize the banks to take over their weaker competi-
tors. The institutionalization of the active role of the state 
in Danish banking crises is perhaps most clearly seen in 
the development of the resolution company Financial 
Stability. The aim of Financial Stability developed from 
a simple liquidation company to a more pro-active and 
powerful instrument of the authorities, one clear example 
being the way Financial Stability helped FIH Erhvervs-
bank survive and develop rather than simply liquidating 
the institution. Financial Stability turned out to provide 
more direct access to distressed banks, for example in 
their role as negotiators of the terms of the individual 
state guarantees of Bankpackage II as well as overseeing 
the bidding process in relation to the unwinding of dis-
tressed banks (choosing who could bid and at what price) 
and putting their own people on the boards of banks close 
to failing. In sum, the Danish SRR is not a move towards 
a more market conforming approach to bank resolution, 
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but rather constitutes an institutionalization of the role 
of the state in bank crises.
Second, the Danish bank resolution regime remains 
the only regime that has actually used one of the resolu-
tion tools that international policy elites put most of their 
faith in, namely the bailing in of creditors (see section 
two)4. Here the message is generally negative: though 
the authorities in two cases actually used the resolution 
regime and forced creditors to take hair-cuts on their 
investment, the consequences for other Danish banks – 
whose position the authorities had no interest in hurting 
– were dire. Part of the reason why the Danish authorities 
were not more successful in using their resolution regime 
is that they seem to have disregarded that Denmark is 
a small open economy and so exposed their banks to 
‘unfair competition’ with other financial systems. If, for 
example, the American authorities choose to let creditors 
suffer, other presumably healthy banks in their sectors 
would not be shut out of the international capital markets 
as happened in the Danish case. However, studying the 
American system does not give the impression that the 
authorities will use the market power of the American 
or British financial system to force a bail-in of creditors. 
Rather, they seem keen to keep merging ailing institu-
tions while trying to avoid too much turmoil in the mar-
kets (Carstensen 2013a; see also Attinger 2011). 
Third, the Danish case is filled with examples of how 
SRRs may work as a tool for political interests. Among 
the most prominent are the cases of FIH Erhvervsbank 
and VestjyskBank. In the case of FIH Erhvervsbank, the 
authorities broke the principle that Financial Stability 
was only a liquidation company for destitute banks and 
instead actively supported the bank by taking toxic as-
sets amounting to 17 billion DKr off their books even 
though the bank was not close to insolvency. The reason: 
to avoid that the bank liquidating their assets too fast and 
in a way that would hurt a large number of struggling 
farmers and construction businesses. Another case where 
the SRR was used in a politically opportune way was the 
case of Vestjysk Bank, where the state gained a majority 
of the shares in the bank and kept it alive despite being 
very close to failure a number of times. As mentioned, 
bankpackage IV was also changed so weak financial in-
stitutions could merge and obtain an extension of state 
guarantees. This was done to keep Vestjysk Bank and the 
many over-indebted farmers that were customers of the 
bank afloat. On the other hand, in the case of a number 
of other banks that have been less politically important 
to maintain, crisis management has been significantly 
harsher. The most prominent examples are the cases of 
Amagerbanken and Fjordbank Mors, where the haircuts 
on creditors following the sell-off of assets so far have 
amounted to approximately 15 per cent. This might in-
dicate that the assets in the banks were undervalued by 
Financial Stability and the Danish FSA and hence that 
the banks were actually solvent. These cases illustrate how 
SRRs can lend authorities more flexibility in crisis man-
agement, and thus how SRRs may function not just to 
counter ‘moral hazard’ in the financial industry but also 
as a political tool.
Fourth, the Danish case does not lend support to the 
idea that SRRs can work effectively to avoid bailouts, 
most notably by illustrating the difficulties of letting 
creditors of banks of any size suffer losses. Starting from 
the relatively market conforming approach of letting 
creditors suffer haircuts in bankpackage III, the Dan-
ish authorities ended up adopting bankpackage IV that 
either bails out creditors through subsidized mergers – 
funded collectively by the Danish banking sector – or, in 
a different version of a bailout, offers extensions on state 
guaranteed bonds to more or less healthy institutions. 
With the hope of avoiding a crisis in the first place in the 
largest financial institutions – the so-called Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) - the govern-
ment has proposed stricter capital requirements of up to 
three per cent of risk weigthed assets (SIFI Committee 
2013, Ministry of Business and Innovation 2013). The 
big question remains if it is realistic that the authorities 
will accept the real economic consequences of resolving 
a bank that controls more than 30 per cent of all assets 
in the Danish financial sector (like Danske Bank), and if 
it is technically possible to do so without severe systemic 
knock-on effects.
It is important to acknowledge that the credibility 
of a commitment to wind down SIFIs is not based solely 
or even mostly on having the right resolution technolo-
gies in place. What might very well turn out to be more 
important is the politics of such a manoeuvre. That is, 
to wind down a SIFI it is necessary for the resolution 
authority to be independent of the ensuing political rami-
fications, which in turn might be problematic from a 
democratic point of view. One recent example of this is 
the bailing in of creditors and some depositors in a num-
ber of the largest banks in Cyprus. In that case, one could 
argue that the Cypriot banks were wound down because 
the electoral/democratic connection between those de-
ciding to bail in and those suffering from the bail in was 
severed. Put differently, it was much easier for European 
leaders to insist on bailing in creditors, because neither 
their own banks nor their constituents were hurt in the 
process. That, however, does not make the commitment 
of the European leaders to wind down their own SIFIs 
more credible. 
50 T IDSSKRIF TE T POLIT IK  SPECIAL RESOLuTION REGIMES IN POST-CRIS IS F INANCIAL REGuL ATION
4. Conclusion
Policy elites and academic economists generally conceive 
of SRRs in functionalist terms, i.e. as a technological fix 
that together with more stringent capital and liquidity re-
quirements may help avoid a future crisis like that recently 
experienced in the international financial system. Not 
disregarding the particular merits of this perspective, it is 
important to see that like most institutions, SRRs entail 
battles between actors with considerable distributional 
consequences. SRRs are political tools that to a larger 
or lesser extent enable authorities to govern the financial 
system. This means that SRRs may be directed towards 
other goals than the ones officially sought by public of-
ficials. One obvious example is the TBTF problem. SRRs 
are officially aimed at enabling authorities to wind down 
financial institutions of any size without serious effects on 
the financial system and the real economy, but they are 
also useful in conducting bailouts in a more controlled 
and institutionalized way. With the implementation of 
SRRs, authorities can bail out TBTF financial institution 
using legally institutionalized rules rather than the ad hoc 
crisis management that characterized crisis management 
in the recent crisis.
SRRs are a relatively recent add-on to the interna-
tional financial regulatory framework, and we have yet 
to see just how effective they will be in deterring risky 
behavior and avoiding the disorderly resolution of banks 
in crisis. However, as suggested above, the Danish case 
offers an interesting first look at how SRRs may work. As 
such, the Danish case does not support the conclusion 
that SRRs signal a return to a more market conform-
ing relation between the state and the financial sector. 
Instead, the otherwise relatively ambitious SRR of bank-
package III has been replaced by a dowry scheme that 
bails out creditors through subsidized mergers. In other 
SRRs, like for example the American, SRRs embody a 
more flexible approach to crisis management and not 
necessarily an end to bailouts. In that light it seems more 
probable that in the future authorities will take on an 
even more active role in managing crises and that SRRs 
will play a central role in legitimizing this move.
question the evaluation of Financial Stability that led to the closing 
of the bank.
3. Senior creditors of Fjordbank Mors were expected to suffer haircuts 
of around 26 per cent. As in the case of Amagerbanken, the haircuts 
have since been reduced significantly, to 14 per cent.
4. Recently bondholders and depositors not covered by deposit insur-
ance were bailed in in Cyprus. This case, however, was markedly 
different from normal SRR, because the bail-in was a requirement 
to receive a rescue package to the economy.
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